

morally motivated concern with the nature of the human knower and the powers, limits, and manifold derangements of human reason — in part under the influence of Rousseau’s critique of the morally and politically corrupting influences of the unbounded exercise of theoretical reason and technical-instrumental rationality uninformed by moral wisdom.

Florschütz discusses only the first two of these topics, and he never fully enters into their inner logic, contenting himself merely with the indication of parallel teachings.

Overall, I find Florschütz’s treatment of the Kant–Swedenborg relationship to be more suggestive than conclusive. Even with these criticisms, Florschütz’s work is still the place to start for a serious examination of the relationship between Kant and Swedenborg’s ideas and mutual influence. This project has much to recommend it, for today the annals of paranormal research are crowded with attempts to carve out a place for paranormal phenomena within the paradigm of modern scientific naturalism, which confines itself to empirical investigations of spatiotemporal phenomena. I suspect, however, that these attempts are doomed to frustration. Thus it is useful to study the reactions of Kant and Schopenhauer to Swedenborg, for their transcendental idealism allows us to find a place for both paranormal phenomena (which transcend space and time) and “normal” phenomena (which fall inside space and time) in a single, comprehensive world-view.

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**North America’s Great Ape: The Sasquatch** by John A. Bendernagel. Courtenay, British Columbia (POB 3286, V9N 5N4): Beachcomber Books, 1998, 270 pp., \$25.00, (p). ISBN: 0-9682887-0-7, beachcom@island.net, <http://www.island.net/~johnb/>

Sasquatch (long a, broad a) is a Coast Salish (Amerinds of British Columbia and Washington) word translated as “wildman of the woods” and equivalent to “bigfoot” in the popular press. Two wildmen, Enkidu and Humbaba, are characters in *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, the first recorded human adventure. Synonymous terms in Chinese, French, and German are *ye ren*, *homme sauvage*, and *wildermann*. A hundred news reports of wildman sightings are found in the North American English press of the 19th century, and thousands — by various names — in the 20th. John Green (personal communication) suggests, on the basis of his four plus decades of cataloging reports, that with Web input included, several hundred sightings a year, at least, are currently reported in North America. Who has best sampled and analyzed this robust, long-standing stream of data? John Bendernagel (broad a).

Rarely have I encountered so elegant, if limited, a book. Three-fifths of the pages are devoted to 21 succinct chapters; the remainder to nine appendices, notes, a glossary, references, and three indices. The clarity and economy of style are wonderful. The author's credentials as a Ph.D. wildlife biologist whose career includes work in Iran, East Africa, and the Caribbean are impeccable.

Bendernagel's sample ( $n \cong 150$ ), carefully documented in extensive notes, is drawn primarily from his personal accumulation of reports over more than 20 years research in British Columbia and from the voluminous files of the "perservering" Green. Given the wealth of reported detail about wildman presented, the thorough review of the literature on pongid (chimps, gorillas and orangutan) behavior and the comparative analysis of these two data sets, it is perhaps inevitable that a few details might have been overlooked.

I found three, the first only a matter of emphasis. Although reports of the "incredible speed" (*i.e.*, 30+ mph) which wildman is occasionally seen to attain are included, Bendernagel fails to mention this significant aspect of their capabilities in Chapter 6, "Locomotion and Gait."

The second detail concerns variation of hair color. While the great majority of reports that mention color describe wildman's coat as black, dark, shades of brown and red, gray or white, I would add yellow, on the basis of "Yellow Top" (Green, 1978, pp. 248–250). Three news reports datelined Cobalt, located at the northern edge of the concentration of human population in southern Ontario, were published in 1923, 1946, and 1970. The 1923 report mentions another 17 years earlier. Together, these reports give us the best estimate of the life span of these marvelous folk, and suggest that their total variation of hair color is precisely like that of *Homo sapiens* and unlike the basically monochromatic coats of the various great apes.

And if a goal of the book is to move bigfoot, sasquatch, wildman, *etc.*, from "controversial knowledge" to "mammalogy" in the Dewey Decimal Classification (p. 207), several paragraphs describing collection techniques of a potential DNA type specimen might have been provided. Given the failure at UC San Francisco over a decade ago and over the past three years at Ohio State to extract a suitable sample from hair, better alternatives appear to be feces, urine, and blood. Would something as simple as half a q-tip, popped into a pill bottle and frozen asap, suffice?

The remainder of the book, so far as matters of appearance and behavior, and the comparative analysis of these relative to those of the great apes are concerned, is faultless.

But the major biological conclusion — reflected in the title — is simply asserted. The alternative hypothesis, that wildman is a hominid (the term does not appear in the text or the appendices; the definition offered in the glossary is disingenuous and unattributed), is ignored. Why? "[T]he existence of a habitually bipedal primate other than humans may be an unacceptable concept for many of us," Bendernagel observes (p. 149), after a hundred-and-fifty-odd

pages of sparse scientific prose illustrating in detail “the existence of [another] habitually bipedal primate!”

Before judging the author too harshly, the JSE reader might reflect: Is the concept implicit in the reports of UFO abductions — that we are host to sexual parasites (and may have been for centuries (James, 1597)) — unacceptable to many? Caught between the overwhelming cultural certainty that there is no such thing and the widespread cultural uncertainty about our place in nature (one in two Americans reportedly regards evolution as ungodly), Bendernagel has chosen a rigorous sampling, a limited but useful comparative analysis and the least “unacceptable” conclusion.

According to Tattersall (1993, p. 94): “The only thing that does seem firmly established is that a little under 1 million years ago the ‘robust’ [hominids] became finally extinct, leaving no descendants behind them.” If, on the basis of this “authority,” it cannot be a robust hominid extant, it must be an “ape,” Halpin’s alternative (Halpin and Ames, 1980, p. 3) “unthinkable” notwithstanding.

How firmly is the robust extinction established? There are no data suggesting extinction, only their absence. No deadly selective pressure is suggested; no hypothesis is advanced. Ciochon *et al.* (1990, pp. 195–214) hypothesized the “extinction and extirpation” of “*Gigantopithecus blacki*,” a large, controversial Asian hominoid (the superfamily of hominids and pongids) species known only from three mandibular fragments and over a thousand teeth, by *Homo erectus* through “competitive exclusion.” In 1996 Ciochon *et al.* report: “With the Tbam Kbuyen co-occurrence of 475 ka [thousand years ago], it is evident that *Homo* and *Gigantopithecus* co-existed for more than one million years. During this co-existence in Asia, *Gigantopithecus blacki* increases in size but shows little morphological change....

Finally, I note the omission in references of Napier (1972), and of Sprague and Krantz (1977) and Markotic’ (1984) (to which the reviewer contributed). The first is the work of one of the distinguished anthropologists of the century, the late Sir John Napier. The second contains responses to the first and, for practical purposes, only anthropologist (Roderick Sprague) to solicit scholarly discussion of the subject. The third contains many contributions to the 1978 University of British Columbia Monster Conference omitted from Halpin and Ames (1980). The most notable of these is by the late Carleton Coon, another distinguished anthropologist, and the only member of the US National Academy of Sciences to have cast a big footprint. And the omission of Darwin. Nevertheless, I recommend with a genuine appreciation of all the book includes, to those interested in or intellectually curious about this area of research: Read John Bendernagel’s book.

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**The Shape of Things to Come** by Jane Anderson. Sydney: Random House, 1998. xiii + 290 pp. Aust\$19.95 (p). ISBN 0-09-183667-0.

Written in clear, nontechnical English, Jane Anderson's *The Shape of Things to Come* deals with precognitive dreams and synchronicity, and how these phenomena do not conflict with relativity and quantum physics.

Major topics covered are dream recall and interpretation; hypnosis and precognition; neurolinguistic programming (NLP); the paradoxical nature of time; fate, free will, and individual responsibility; and the link between synchronicity and dreams, about which she writes: "We believe we distinguish a difference between precognition and synchronicity, whereas in fact the difference is an illusion based on our inability to rid ourselves of the concept of linear time" (p.196).

The book begins with many examples of dreams that literally or symbolically have shown future events. While some may be coincidences, no reasonable person would suggest that all of them fall into this category. This means that people around the world are, in their millions, glimpsing future events — an activity forbidden by many orthodox scientists.

Anderson, author of two previous books on dreams, says that most precognitive dreams use nonverbal symbolism. It takes effort to learn how to decode the messages, and: "... in endeavoring to understand how waking life events can follow dreams, we need to include a look at the multiple small, baffling, yet seemingly insignificant happenings as well as the big mind-blowing epics" (p.29). She then gives precise details on how to develop precognition, *via* dreaming, in which accurate records are kept of dreams, examples of synchronicity, and life events.

Part of her research involved in-depth interviews with four professional clairvoyants, perhaps the weakest part of the book. While we are told all four have impressive records, we are in the realm of anecdotes. Of more interest is the fact that the professionals share common views about time: that past, pre-