

lations of the highest truth on the other” (p. 153). Any reader who conceives of LSD as a “hallucinogen” will find their old preconceptions untenable.

For 25 years now, any hint of tolerance or advocacy for psychedelic drugs has been anathema to established political and public opinion. Therefore, in spite of the authors’ carefully cultivated objectivity and balance, it is unlikely their work will have any greater impact on policy than it did in 1979. For most of the ideological spectrum, psychedelics are a closed issue. This is unfair. Today, even more than in 1979, aspects of the psychedelic experience are cropping up in fields as diverse as ufology, holistic medicine, death and reincarnation studies, transpersonal psychology, and anomalies research, demanding that we do as the book’s title suggests—reconsider psychedelics.

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The Meaning of Consciousness by Andrew Lohrey. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997. 301 pp. ISBN 0-472-10821-2.

To be fair to the author, I may not be the right critic to provide an unbiased review of his book. I am, to put my cards on the table, an unreconstructed Cartesian dualist when it comes to the mind–brain problem and a follower of Popper and Eccles, who come in for criticism in this book. The author, on the other hand, as Katherine Hayles makes clear in her foreword, “develops a perspective radically different from a presumed separation between subject and object. Instead of seeing a world ‘out there’ separate from an observer, Lohry emphasizes the mutual construction of world, subject and discourse” (p. xii). And our author, in his own introduction, confirms what she says when he writes: “a science of consciousness should rely, not on reason or empiricism and their attendant conventions, which asks how consciousness arises from matter, but on a perspective paradigm which reverses the question to ask how matter arises from consciousness” (p. 2). Later, he adds that his book both develops and works from a new, non-rationalist and non-materialist framework or paradigm which challenges much in the scientific and Cartesian tradition of analysis. This paradigm, he points out, owes more to the new discipline of discourse analysis.

Having thus laid his cards on the table, the author presents a glossary so that we should be in no doubt as to exactly how he is using the 22 key words or phrases that will crop up in the text. The book is scholarly, and the author knows the literature and is familiar with the controversies it has generated. He has read his Sheldrake, although Sheldrake is taken to task for “his lack of a definition of and a lack of structural content for his notions of habit and morphic resonance.”

It is unfortunate that there is no reference to the work of David Chalmers, author of *The Conscious Mind*, but, as that was published only in 1996, it presumably came too late for the present book, which appeared in 1997.

As far as this reviewer is concerned, the parting of the ways comes with Chapter 9, "The Unity of Mind and Body." It is here that Lohrey challenges the pessimism of Karl Popper and John Eccles, who expressed doubts as to whether we shall ever be able to understand "the relation between our bodies and our minds." The author has no such doubts:

I maintain that an isomorphic paradigm, which predisposes to recursive symmetry and therefore unity, can provide a positive answer to this relationship. The nature of this positive answer is that neurological activity in the form of excitation and inhibition are the actual semantic relationships of symmetry, nonsymmetry, and asymmetry and that through these the recursive systems in general of subjectivity are established. The unity of "mind" and body is therefore complete and absolute. (p. 180)

The quotes around the word "mind" say a great deal about the way the author approaches the problem, which is to downplay the distinction, which to many of us seems so unbridgeable, between mind and consciousness on the one hand, and body and matter on the other. But the author is even willing to summon to his aid, U. T. Place, who famously argued that consciousness is just a brain process. It is noteworthy that there is nowhere a discussion of the "paranormal," so we do not know whether the author acknowledges or denies the reality of parapsychological abilities. Yet ever since J. B. Rhine, the existence of such abilities has been cited as demonstrating the independence of mind from material constraints.

It may be that given my own philosophic allegiances, I could not be expected to see matters from the author's point of view. But, as I said at the beginning, I may not be the reviewer that the author deserves.

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